

The *pa/wa* of imperative alternatives¹

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Abstract. This paper deals with topic markers interacting with discourse information in imperatives. It compares two topic markers from Slovenian (*‘pa’*) and Japanese (*‘-wa’*) and shows that while they mostly match in terms of the foci they associate with, their functions differ in imperatives: only *‘pa’* may yield a *concessive imperative* reading. It is shown that this reading can be derived while keeping a single entry for *‘pa’* by making attitudes of discourse participants part of the focus *‘pa’* associates with. The split between Slovenian and Japanese can then be attributed to minor differences in terms of which foci *‘pa’* and *‘-wa’* may associate with.

Keywords: imperatives, Slovenian, Japanese, alternative semantics, topic markers, focus, discourse particles, performative modality.

1. Introduction

Natural language semantics deals not only with what is said but also with what is not said. This is evident in work on information structure, where what must be accounted for is the relation between what is being said and what is already established due to context (Vallduví, 2016). Similarly, the function of discourse particles is to relate to what is not being said. They usually do not contribute to the “core” propositional content of utterances. Rather, they convey information about the discourse participants (the speaker and the addressee of the utterance) (Zimmermann, 2011). Despite these similarities, the two domains are generally not explicitly connected in theoretical work. This paper takes a step in that direction with a case study of the function of topic particles from two languages—Slovenian and Japanese—specifically, their use in imperatives. As a baseline, topic particles in both Slovenian and Japanese are used to express *contrast*. In Slovenian, the particle is *‘pa’* and in Japanese *‘-wa’*:

- (1) a. Zvitorepec **pa** je plesal. [Slovenian]
S.NOM PA AUX.3 danced.M
‘Slyboots was dancing (as opposed to doing something else).’
- b. John-ga odori-**wa**-sita. [Japanese]
John-NOM dance-WA-did
‘John danced (as opposed to doing something else).’

In both examples, in addition to the propositional content of the sentence (i.e. *that Slyboots was dancing* in (1a), and *that John danced* in (1b)), the particles relate the predicate ‘dance’ (or the event of dancing), which is a part of the utterance, to other predicates (or events) that are merely contextually given. Roughly put, *‘pa’* and *‘-wa’* convey that the relevant individual is dancing, and not doing something else they could conceivably be doing. That is what we mean when we say that ‘dance’ is *contrasted*. However, despite their similarity in (1), the two particles differ

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when used in imperatives. Only ‘*pa*’ has what appears to be a discourse particle use. That is, only ‘*pa*’ can yield what we call a *concessive imperative*:

- (2) a. A: *Don’t eat that fish! It’s poisonous.*
 b. B: *I eat that kind of fish all the time, and I’m still alive.*
 c. A (Slo.): **Pa** pojej jo! [✓concessive]
 PA eat.IMP.(2) 3.F.ACC
 ‘OK, eat it then!’
 c’ A (Jpn.): #Tabe-**wa**-si-ro-yo! [✗concessive]
 eat-WA-DO-IMP-SFP
 ‘At least EAT it!’ (⇐ can only mean)

What distinguishes a concessive imperative from a canonical one is that the former signals a disagreement between the speaker and addressee along the lines of (3).²

- (3) *A canonical imperative P!* commits the speaker to wanting the addressee to make *P* true. *A concessive imperative* $\not\models P!$ signals: (i) that the speaker wants the addressee to make $\neg P$ true and (ii) that the speaker acknowledges the addressee wants to make *P* true.

In this paper, we argue that the concessive use of ‘*pa*’ can be captured without positing two homophonous versions of ‘*pa*’. Specifically, we claim that its “discourse particle” use is, in fact, identical to its function as a topic particle. We establish this by first closely comparing of the function of ‘-*wa*’ and ‘*pa*’ both outside imperatives (Section 2) and in imperatives (Section 3). We show that their behavior is parallel up to the point where we look at imperatives being contrasted with modals (Section 3.1) and more importantly concessive imperatives (Section 3.2), for which we establish that their core contribution in the discourse is to signal speaker-addressee disagreement to the point where this affects the speaker distancing ban characteristic of imperatives (Section 3.2.1). Based on this, we propose that concessive imperatives can be modeled in parallel with focus in an alternative semantics approach (Section 4); specifically, the disagreement conveyed by a concessive imperative is actually the result of a contrast between the attitudes of the speaker and addressee in the context. Finally, we discuss two analyses of what gives rise to the differences between ‘*pa*’ and ‘-*wa*’ in terms of licensing concessive imperatives.

2. Two languages, two particles, same foci?

The Japanese suffixal particle ‘-*wa*’ has two main interpretations: it can mark a thematic topic (aboutness topic) or a contrastive topic (see Kuno, 1973; Heycock, 2008). These functions are exemplified in (4a) and (4b) respectively (CAPS on the stressed syllable indicate focus).

- (4) a. John-**wa** ringo-o tabe-ta. [thematic topic]
 John-WA apple-ACC eat-PAST
 ‘As for John, he ate an apple.’

²We use the term concessive somewhat differently from its traditional use; see e.g. König (2009). We return to a more detailed discussion of what the concessive imperative reading exactly encodes in Section 3.2.

- b. John-ga RINgo-wa tabe-ta. [contrastive topic]
 John-NOM apple-WA eat-PAST
 ‘John ate an apple (as opposed to something else).’

In (4a), ‘-wa’ attaches to the constituent that the sentence is about (i.e. John)—the thematic topic or theme of the sentence. However, what we focus on in this paper are cases like (4b), where ‘-wa’ marks a contrast between the constituent it attaches to (i.e. ‘apple’) and other constituents the speaker could have used in its place in the given context (e.g. a different fruit). Constituents to which this contrastive ‘-wa’ attaches get focal stress, so in (4b) ‘*ringo*’ is stressed.³ In general, contrastive ‘-wa’ can attach to a number of phrases of different categories: NPs (cf. (4b)), VPs (cf. (5a)),⁴ PPs (cf. (5b)), and APs (cf. (5c)). As indicated in the corresponding translations, the contrastive topic marker ‘-wa’ consistently marks contrast between the word or phrase it attaches to (its “host”) and other elements of the same category (or semantic type).

- (5) a. John-ga oDORI-wa-sita. [VP]
 John-NOM dance-WA-did
 ‘John danced (as opposed to doing something else).’
 b. Tokyo-E-wa gakusei-ga i-tta-ga, Tokyo-KARA-wa ko-naka-tta. [PP]
 Tokyo-to-WA student-NOM go-PAST-but Tokyo-from-WA come-NEG-PAST
 ‘Students went to Tokyo, but didn’t come from Tokyo.’
 c. YaWARAKAku-wa-aru-kedo atatakaku-nai buranketto [AP]
 soft-WA-is-but warm-NEG blanket
 ‘The blanket which is soft, but not warm’

In Slovenian, similar constructions to those just discussed are expressed using the ‘*pa*’ particle.⁵ Like ‘-wa’, ‘*pa*’ can mark sentence topics by following them. This includes thematic topics, as in (6), as well as contrastive topics, as in (7). On other words, ‘*pa*’ in (6) marks what the sentence is about (cf. ‘-wa’ in (4a)), and in (7) it signals contrast (cf. ‘-wa’ in (4b)); e.g. in (7a) ‘studied’ is contrasted with ‘eat’. Like with Japanese, we will focus on this later use.

- (6) a. A: You already know Hungerpot and Thickhead, did you maybe have the chance to meet Slyboots?
 b. B: Zvitorepca **pa** še nisem spoznal. [thematic topic]
 S.GEN PA yet not.AUX.1 met.M.3
 ‘As for Slyboots, I did not meet him yet.’
 (7) a. Lakotnik je jedel, Trdonja **pa** se je učil. [contrastive topic]
 H.NOM AUX.2 ate.M T.NOM PA REFL.ACC AUX.3 studied.M
 ‘Hungerpot was eating whereas Thickhead was studying.’

³ ‘-wa’ itself can also be stressed; e.g. *ringo-wa* in (4b) can surface as *ringo-WA*. Furthermore, both ‘-wa’ and the constituent can get focal stress, as in *RINgo-WA*. See Tomioka (2010a) for relevant discussion.

⁴ The verb form in (5a) is called *renyookei* in traditional grammars and is sometimes seen as a nominalized verb. The exact category of the form is not relevant to the discussion here. See Tagawa (2008) for relevant discussion.

⁵ The particle has many other use beyond those that we discuss here (see Marušič et al. 2011, 2015 for discussion). Most notably, there is a conjunction ‘*pa*’. But it is probably a distinct element; it does not have the same form across different varieties of Slovenian, and differs from other instances of ‘*pa*’ in that it is not a 2nd position clitic.

- b. Lakotniku je všeč meso, Trdonji **pa** (je všeč) soLAta.
 H.DAT AUX.3 like meat.NOM T.DAT PA (AUX.3 like) salad.NOM
 ‘Hungerpot likes meat, whereas Thickhead likes salad.’

It should be noted that despite their semantic/pragmatic similarities (as thematic/contrastive topic) markers, ‘*pa*’ and ‘*-wa*’ differ in their morpho-syntactic distribution. Recall that ‘*-wa*’ is a suffix, but ‘*pa*’ is a 2nd position clitic. Note here that the 2nd position requirement applies to the whole clitic cluster (see Franks and King, 2000; Bošković, 2001), and ‘*pa*’ specifically can appear either before or after any other clitics in the cluster, as shown by the sentences in (8).⁶

- (8) a. Lakotnik **pa** se ji je opraVIčil.
 H.NOM PA REFL.ACC 3.F.DAT AUX.3 apologized.M
 b. Lakotnik se ji je **pa** opraVIčil.
 H.NOM REFL.ACC 3.F.DAT AUX.3 PA apologized.M
 ‘As for Hungerpot, he apologized to her.’

As reported by Marušič et al. (2011), ‘*pa*’ can even appear within the clitic cluster itself, but only if the following clitic(s) are focused, as illustrated in (9).⁷

- (9) Lakotnik mu jo je vzela, Trdonja mu **pa** GA je vzela.
 H.NOM 3.M.DAT 3.F.ACC AUX.3 took.M T.NOM 3.M.DAT PA 3.M.ACC AUX.3 took.M
 ‘Hungerpot took her from him, whereas Thickhead took HIM/IT from him.’

This property of ‘*pa*’ is very telling with respect to its role as a topic marker. As shown further in (10a) and (10b), only elements below/to the right of ‘*pa*’ in a clause can bear focus.⁸

- (10) a. Rekel sem, da Zvitorepca bom **pa** JAZ poklical.
 said.M AUX.1 that S.ACC will.1 PA I call.M
 ‘I said that I (as opposed to someone else) will call Slyboots.’
 b. Rekel sem, da Lakotnika bom **pa** (jaz) poKLlcal.
 said.M AUX.1 that H.ACC will.1 PA I call.M
 ‘I said that I will call (as opposed to invite/hug/pat . . .) Hungerpot.’

Crucially, in contrast to (10a) and (10b), nothing higher than/to the left of ‘*pa*’ can be focused. Thus, in (11a), the subject pronoun, which is higher than ‘*pa*’, cannot be focused. In the same way, the focus on the verb results in ungrammaticality in (11b).⁹

⁶Marušič et al. (2011) do not report any differences between the two sentences in (8), but (8a) is more natural with a contrastive topic interpretation, accompanied by stress on the relevant focused element to the right of ‘*pa*’.

⁷Slovenian clitic pronouns are exceptional in their ability to be stressed (Bošković, 2001).

⁸The ‘*bo(m)*’ and ‘*pa*’ clitic cluster is technically in the 3rd position here, as the topic ‘*Slyboots*’ appears right after the complementizer. Slovenian is more flexible with the 2nd position requirement than other languages in its family (Franks and King, 2000; Bošković, 2001; Sheppard and Golden, 2002), which we return to in Section 5.

⁹Both examples in (11) are grammatical if the word preceding ‘*pa*’ is not focused, just like the examples in (10) are (see footnote 8 regarding the exceptional 3rd position placement of the clitic cluster in such examples).

- (11) a. *Rekel sem, da JAZ bom **pa** poklical Lakotnika.
 said.M AUX.1 that I will.1 PA call.M H.ACC
 int.: ‘I said that I (as opposed to someone else) will call Hungerpot.’
- b. *Rekel sem, da poKLlcal bom **pa** (jaz) Lakotnika.
 said.M AUX.1 that call.M will.1 PA I H.ACC
 int.: ‘I said that I will call (as opposed to invite/hug/pat ...) Hungerpot.’

These examples show that ‘*pa*’ is indeed a topic marker—in that it must immediately follow the topic—foci can only appear to its right. Furthermore, the placement of ‘*pa*’ is restricted with respect to other focus sensitive particles like the clitic ‘*že*’ (“already”), which cannot precede ‘*pa*’, as seen in (12), showing that even elements that only associate with focus must follow ‘*pa*’.

- (12) a. *Lakotnik se ji je že **pa** opravičil.
 H.NOM REFL.ACC 3.F.DAT AUX.3 already PA apologized.M
- b. Lakotnik se ji je **pa** že opravičil.
 H.NOM REFL.ACC 3.F.DAT AUX.3 PA already apologized.M
 ‘As for Hungerpot, he already apologized to her.’

The placement of ‘*pa*’ is sensitive to information structure; topics (thematic or contrastive) always occur to its left, whereas foci and other focus sensitive particles may only occur to its right. Similarly, contrastive ‘-*wa*’ in Japanese marks the focus by attaching to it. In that sense, the information structure status of the constituents in a sentence can be “read off” the two particles in their respective languages by looking at their placement.

3. Imperatives with ‘*pa/wa*’

The focus of our paper is the behavior of the two particles in imperatives, and at first glance ‘*pa*’ and ‘-*wa*’ have the same semantic contribution in imperatives as in the plain declaratives seen above. As seen in (13) and (14), the use of ‘*pa*’ and ‘-*wa*’ marks contrast on “salmon”.¹⁰

- (13) a. A: *I’m at the store, and they don’t have tuna, eel, or mackerel.*
 b. B: Kupi **pa** LOsos-a. [Slovenian]
 buy.IMP.(2) PA salmon-ACC
 ‘Buy salmon then.’
- (14) a. A: *To open a sushi bar, we have to buy lots of different kinds of fish. But we don’t have enough money to do so.*
 b. B: SAke-**wa** ka-e-yo! [Japanese]
 salmon-WA buy-IMP-SFP
 ‘Buy at least salmon!’ (cf. Hara, 2006; Tomioka, 2010a)

¹⁰Notice that the contexts in (13) and (14) are slightly adjusted for each language due to the “at least” reading that arises with ‘-*wa*’, which is also available outside of imperatives; see 4.2).

3.1. Contrasting imperatives with modals

The special status of imperatives becomes apparent when they are contrasted with a modalized declarative. In the Slovenian example (15a), a contrast is made between the imperative roughly equivalent to *You should go to school* (marked by ‘*pa*’) and *You need to go to school* (explicitly negated in the first clause). The imperative is being contrasted with a modal clause, just like modals can be contrasted with other modals, as in (15b), where *need* and *can* are contrasted.¹¹

- (15) a. Ni ti treba it v šolo, vseeno **pa** POJdi!
 not 3.DAT need go.INF in school.ACC anyway PA go.IMP.(2)
 ‘You don’t have to go to school, but you should go anyway!’
- b. Ni ti treba it v šolo, vseeno **pa** lahKO greš.
 not 3.DAT need go.INF in school.ACC anyway PA can go.2
 ‘You don’t have to go to school, but you can go anyway!’

Examples like (15a) cannot be replicated in Japanese, but this seems to be independent from any differences in the imperatives themselves. That is, the use of ‘*-wa*’ to contrast different modals like in (15b) is limited to begin with. There are cases where ‘*-wa*’ can attach to modal elements, like (16), but it is not entirely clear if their function is parallel to that of (15b).

- (16) John-ga gakoo-ni iku-koto-ga-DEKI-**wa**-suru-ga, (koosoku-zyoo) ika-naku-temoii
 John-NOM school-to go-thing-NOM-can-**wa**-do-but school.regulation-on go-NEG-may
 ‘John can go to school, but he does not have to go (given the school regulations).’

It might be that this difference is because of the “at least” reading of ‘*-wa*’, which we return to in Section 5. If the split between Japanese and Slovenian seen here is real, it already indicates that despite the functions of ‘*-wa*’ and ‘*pa*’ being largely parallel as topic markers (as we saw above, there are differences in terms of the kinds of foci they may associate with). This will be important as we move on to our discussion of the asymmetry with concessive imperatives.¹²

3.2. Concessive imperatives

Recall that in Slovenian, but crucially not in Japanese, a topic particle may yield a concessive reading of an imperative. This asymmetry is illustrated again in (17).¹³

¹¹One may here wonder whether examples like (15a) contrast different speech acts. However, we will argue that another reading, namely the concessive reading, involves contrast at the speech act level.

¹²But see Tomioka (2010a) who argues that ‘*-wa*’ operates on speech acts. It should be noted that speech acts in Tomioka (2010a) differ from what we will treat as speech act alternatives in the text below.

¹³We do not claim that Japanese lacks concessive imperatives. What we show here is that concessive imperatives with a contrastive topic marker are impossible. In fact, Japanese employs an alternative strategy to form concessive imperatives, shown in (i), where the conditional marker ‘*nara*’ is employed to convey the speaker’s concession.

- (17) a. A: *Don't eat that fish! It's poisonous.*
 b. B: *I eat that kind of fish all the time, and I'm still alive.*
 c. A (Slo.): **Pa** pojej jo! c. A (Jpn.): #Tabe-wa-si-ro-yo!
 PA eat.IMP.(2) 3.F.ACC eat-WA-do-IMP-SFP
 'OK, eat it then!' 'At least eat it!'

In order to better understand what exactly is encoded in a concessive imperative, we can compare it with a couple of other non-canonical imperative functions, which at first glance appear to be similar. These are so called *acquiescence* and *indifference* readings (see von Fintel and Iatridou, 2017). The hallmark of the former is that they signal that the speaker does not have a problem with the addressee carrying out the action described by the imperative (e.g. '*Sure. Go ahead. Open the window!*'), but they do not function as commands and do not seem to impose an obligation on the addressee. Similarly, an indifference imperative (as the name suggests) signals that the speaker has no opinion about whether the addressee should or should not act in accordance with the imperative (e.g. '*Open the window! Don't open the window! I don't care.*').

The similarity between concessive imperatives and the two other readings just discussed is the lack of the speaker imposing an obligation on the addressee, but crucially concessive readings cannot just be reduced to either acquiescence or indifference readings—they give rise to an additional inference: that the speaker and addressee disagree over the imperative. This is best illustrated by the infelicity of the Slovenian examples in (18) and (19), where '*pa*'-imperatives are respectively forced into an acquiescence and indifference context.

- (18) a. A: *It's getting warm. Can I open the window?* [X acquiescence]
 b. B: Seveda. #**Pa** odpri ga!
 sure PA open.IMP.(2) 3.M.ACC
 int.: 'Sure. Open it!'
 (19) a. A: *It's getting warm. Should I open the window?* [X indifference]
 b. B: #**Pa** odpri ga ali ne odpri ga! Mene ne briga.
 PA open.IMP.(2) 3.M.ACC or NEG open.IMP.(2) 3.M.ACC me.ACC NEG care
 int.: 'Open it or don't open it! I don't care.'

(18) only works if the speaker wants to convey reluctance about letting the addressee open the window, whereas (19) is infelicitous even out of the blue. We argue that this is because concessive imperatives do in fact convey the speaker's preferences, albeit indirectly; concession

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- (i) Nara, ik-e!
 If go-IMP
 'Well, go then!'

Interestingly, in Slovenian, a '*pa*'-concessive imperative may be preceded by a conditional clause, as in (ii), but due to reasons of space we leave the exploration of a potential parallelism between the two for future work.

- (ii) Če tako misliš, (potem) **pa** pojdi!
 if this think.2, then PA go.IMP.(2)
 'If you think that's the case, then go!'

involves the speaker expressing the addressee's preferences in contradistinction with their own preferences. Concession crucially does not express speaker indifference, nor does it express that the speaker has no problem with the addressee carrying out the action described in the imperative—disagreement is actually the key. And as we show next, the addressee's preferences actually have a privileged status in concessive imperatives.

3.2.1. Speaker distancing in concessive imperatives

When a canonical imperative is uttered, the speaker cannot also explicitly state a preference for the negation of the propositional content of that imperative, as shown in (20a) for English (Kaufmann, 2012; Condoravdi and Lauer, 2012). Follow-ups that have this effect, like '*... but I don't want you to*', can be seen as cases of *distancing* by the speaker (Stegovec and Kaufmann, 2015). The observation carries over to Slovenian and Japanese, as seen in (20b) and (20c).

- (20) a. #Buy salmon! But I don't want you to buy it.
 b. #Kupi lososa! Ampak nočem, da ga kupiš!
 buy.IMP.(2) salmon.ACC but not.want.1 that 3.M.ACC buy.2
 'Buy salmon! But I don't want you to buy it.'
 c. #Sake-o ka-e! Demo watasi-wa kimi-ni soo-site-hosiku-nai.
 salmon-ACC buy-IMP but I-TOP you-DAT SO-do-want-NEG
 'Buy salmon! But I don't want you to do so.'

Crucially, distancing by the speaker is constrained differently in concessive imperatives. In a '*pa*'-concessive, the speaker may felicitously express a preference for the negation of the propositional content of the imperative, as in (21a).¹⁴ Note that this is not possible when '*-wa*' is used with an imperative in Japanese as in (21b), highlighting the asymmetry between the two.

- (21) a. ?Pa kupi lososa! Ampak (jaz) nočem, da ga kupiš!
 PA buy.IMP.(2) salmon.ACC but I not.want.1 that 3.M.ACC buy.2
 'Well, buy salmon then! But I don't want you to buy it.'
 b. #Sake-wa ka-e! Demo watasi-wa kimi-ni soo-site-hosiku-nai.
 salmon-WA buy-IMP but I-TOP you-DAT SO-do-want-NEG
 'Buy at least salmon! But I don't want you to do so.'

In contrast to (21a), if the speaker of a concessive imperative tries to follow it up by attributing the preference for the negation of the imperative's propositional content to the addressee, this yields infelicity. This is shown in (22a) with a Slovenian '*pa*'-concessive, contrasted again with a Japanese example in (22b)—showing that the latter is not a concessive imperative.

¹⁴The degradation in (21a) is due to the follow up feeling redundant—it essentially conveys what the concessive imperative already conveys on its own. It should also be noted that the distancing facts are more intricate than we have space to discuss here; see Condoravdi and Lauer (2012); Kaufmann (2014) for discussion. The key point remains: although the speaker appears to concede to the addressee's preferences in a concessive imperative, the speaker's original preferences do not entirely disappear—which is what we try to capture with our analysis below.

- (22) a. #**Pa** kupi lososa! Ampak vem da ga nočes kupit!
 PA buy.IMP.(2) salmon.ACC but know.1 that 3.M.ACC not.want.2 buy.INF
 ‘Well, buy salmon then! But I know you don’t want to buy it.’
- b. Sake-**wa** ka-e! Kimi-wa soo-si-taku-nai-no-o sitteru-kedo.
 salmon-WA buy-IMP YOU-TOP SO-do-want-NEG-C-Acc know-though
 ‘Buy at least a salmon! I know you don’t want to do so, though.’

Therefore, while uttering a canonical imperative publicly commits the speaker to the imperative, uttering a concessive imperative makes the speaker publicly acknowledge that the imperative is in line with the addressee’s preferences. An analysis of concessive imperatives must therefore capture that: (i) given a canonical imperative $P!$, where P is a proposition that resolves a decision problem (a set of propositions), a concessive imperative $\text{[}P\text{]}!$ commits the speaker to believing $\neg P$ is the optimal solution, and (ii) the speaker of $\text{[}P\text{]}!$ simultaneously acknowledges that the addressee entertains P as the optimal solution. We propose that although the solutions to the decision problem in (i) and (ii) are in direct conflict, they can both be expressed by a single imperative—a concessive imperative—if we model speaker and addressee commitments/attitudes as focus alternatives. The intuition is that when ‘*pa*’ yields a concessive imperative in Slovenian, ‘*pa*’ is associating with a “focused” representation of speech act participant commitments the same way as it associates with focused predicates in examples like (1a). We proceed to outline our analysis in the following section, providing first the necessary assumptions regarding the semantics of focus alternatives and the semantics of imperatives.

4. Analysis: Hidden alternatives

We propose that all the readings that ‘*pa*’ and ‘*-wa*’ can yield in imperatives—including, crucially, the concessive one—arise from the particles associating with different elements in the narrow focus of the sentence. The contribution of ‘*pa*’ or ‘*-wa*’ to the meaning (and function) of a sentence depends on which element is the narrow focus. The main upshot of the analysis is that a single lexical entry can be given for ‘*pa*’, without having to posit a special status for ‘*pa*’ in its discourse related use. We adopt the core ideas of *alternative semantics* approaches to focus (Karttunen, 1976; Karttunen and Peters, 1979; Rooth, 1985, 1992; Büring, 1997), namely: focus invokes a set of alternative propositions, which constitutes the *focus value* of a sentence ($\llbracket S \rrbracket^{f,c}$). In (23a), where ‘*salmon*’ is the focus, the focus value of the sentence is a set of propositions of the form *Slyboots bought x*, where the focus is replaced by a variable of the same type as the focused element.¹⁵ The variable can correspond to any element of the right type that is salient in the given context (*c*); we represent this semi-formally, for ease of exposition, as in (23b).

- (23) a. Slyboots bought SALmon. b. $\llbracket S \rrbracket^{f,c} = \textit{Slyboots bought} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \textit{salmon} \\ \textit{tuna} \\ \textit{eel} \\ \textit{mackerel} \\ \dots \end{array} \right\}$

¹⁵Minimally, the variable must have the same semantic type, but it may be further (contextually) constrained; e.g. in (23a) we may want to constrain the variable to kinds of fish. We abstract away from this in our discussion.

This focus value of a sentence is in contradistinction to its *ordinary value* ($\llbracket S \rrbracket^{o,c}$), which is the proposition that is actually overtly expressed by the sentence in question:

- (24) a. Slyboots bought SALmon. b. $\llbracket S \rrbracket^{o,c} = \text{Slyboots bought salmon}$

The shorthand we will be using for the meaning of sentences with focus is illustrated in (25a); text in bold marks what is present in both the ordinary value and the focus value of the sentence.

- (25) a. Slyboots bought SALmon. b. $\llbracket S \rrbracket^c = \text{Slyboots bought } \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{salmon} \\ \text{tuna} \\ \text{eel} \\ \text{mackerel} \\ \dots \end{array} \right\}$

Having established the basics of how focus can be interpreted in plain declarative sentences, we can now move on to imperatives. We will be following Kaufmann's (2012) approach to the semantics of imperatives, where their characteristic semantics is attributed to a modal operator—which is at its at-issue level a necessity modal, but equipped with presuppositions that ensure the imperative can only be used performatively. We use represent this modal with 'IMP' with its meaning given in (26); following standard assumptions we treat it as a quantifier over possible worlds whose meaning depends on *conversational backgrounds*—functions from worlds to sets of propositions (Kratzer, 1981, 1991, 2012). These are the *modal base* (f), which yields a (necessarily consistent) body of information, and the *ordering source* (g), which induces an ordering among the worlds that comply with f (and is possibly inconsistent). Given this, we semi-formally represent the meaning of imperatives as illustrated in (27).

- (26) $\llbracket \text{IMP} \rrbracket^c = \lambda f . \lambda g . \lambda p . \lambda w . (\forall v \in O(w, f, g)) [p(v)]$
 ($O(w, f, g)$ is defined as the set of worlds conforming to f at w (i.e., in $\bigcap f(w)$) that are best according to g at w)

- (27) $\llbracket \text{Buy salmon!} \rrbracket^c = \text{IMP you buy salmon}$

The advantage of taking this approach to imperatives may not be that evident at first. This approach does allow us to treat some imperatives with 'pa' and '-wa' as straightforwardly as their declarative counterparts. Since the two elements are focus sensitive particles, imperatives where they associate with a focused direct object as in (28) can both be analyzed as having the meaning in (29), where (29a) is a rough paraphrase and (29b) the semi-formal representation.

- (28) a. Kupi **pa** LOSos-a. b. SAke-**wa** ka-e-yo!
 buy.IMP.(2) PA salmon-ACC salmon-WA buy-IMP-SFP

- (29) a. Buy SALmon! [not tuna, eel, mackerel, ...]

- b. IMP *you buy* $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \textit{salmon} \\ \textit{tuna} \\ \textit{eel} \\ \textit{mackerel} \\ \dots \end{array} \right\}$

The move to treat IMP as a modal also pays off in that we can explain examples where imperatives are being contrasted with modal verbs like in the Slovenian example in (30).

- (30) Ni ti treba it v šolo, vseeno **pa** POJdi!
 not 3.DAT need go.INF in school.ACC anyway PA go.IMP.(2)
 ‘You don’t have to go to school, but you should go anyway!’

In the alternative semantics approach, the variable representing the focused element in the focus value of the sentence is type-restricted, the imperative being contrastively focused against a modal verb implies that the two are of the same relevant type.¹⁶ This follows immediately from a modal analysis of imperatives. Thus, the meaning of the second clause in (30) can be analyzed as in (31)—as the contrast is explicit in this case, the set of propositions in the focus value is contextually narrowed down to the two containing ‘*need*’ and IMP (cf. (31b)).

- (31) a. [*You don’t need to, but*] GO to school anyway!
 b. $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \textbf{IMP} \\ \textit{need} \end{array} \right\}$ *you go to school*

This brings us to the concessive reading. On an intuitive level, a concessive imperative expresses at least two things: (i) an imperative (\approx *you should P*) and (ii) a disagreement between the speaker and addressee concerning the optimal solution to a *decision problem* (\approx *I think you should \neg P* vs. *You think you should P*; see below for a definition). In order to capture these two layers of meaning, we suggest that the two can be thought of as its ordinary value and its focus value respectively, and crucially the ordinary value is tied to addressee preferences and public commitments, as we saw with the asymmetries in speaker distancing above.

A decision problem, following Kaufmann (2012), is a contextually given set of propositions describing future courses of events that jointly exhaust the context set.¹⁷ The prejacent of IMP presents one solution to it, and is therefore one of the elements in the set. What is odd about concessions compared to most other imperatives is that the prejacent of the imperative does not match the speaker’s solution to the decision problem, and the speaker in fact appears to have a preference for the addressee not to act on it (as Kaufmann 2012: 160 admits, this is somewhat problematic for her account). We propose that the speaker/addressee disagreement can be modeled the same way as contrast in information structure terms. The general idea is that

¹⁶As noted previously, contrast seems to be needed to make modal alternatives salient with imperatives. We do not have a ready explanation for this fact, so we leave this question open for further study.

¹⁷Note that decision problems could also be modelled in terms of question sets (cf. Roberts, 1996).

concessive imperatives are special in that they primarily express what the speaker thinks are the addressee's preferences—unlike a canonical imperative, which primarily expresses the speaker's preferences. We suggest that this is why '*pa*' appears in concessive imperatives in Slovenian; as a contrastive topic marker, '*pa*' must range over focus alternatives that in this case include (along with the imperative) the equivalent of an embedding attitude verb (\approx 'A *thinks that*' vs. 'B *thinks that*'). Pending our discussion of how and where this is encoded, this can be thought of along the lines of Ross's (1970) *Performative Hypothesis* as a literal—albeit silent—attitude verb dominating the matrix clause, and we express it as such in our derivation in (32).¹⁸

- (32) a. Speaker: *Eat the fish then!*
 b. $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \textit{You think that} \\ \textit{I think that} \end{array} \right\}$ IMP *you eat the fish*

In (32b), the two “attitude alternatives” are both part of the focus value of the sentence, but only the addressee's is part of the ordinary value. The speaker's attitude is still present though, as part of the focus value—which is meant to capture that the speaker's preferences do not completely disappear with concessives. The imperative component and the prejacent stay constant as '*Eat the fish!*', as they are shared by the ordinary and focus values of the sentence. At first glance, this seems at odds with the idea that the two attitudes include two mutually exclusive solutions to the decision problem ($P/\neg P$), however we argue that the two opposing propositions actually arise analogously to *Neg Raising*, that is: '*I don't think that P*' having the meaning of '*I think that not P*'. Consider $P!$ as the imperative in (32), where the ordinary value of the entire construction is *You think P!*. Note that by virtue of the latter being the ordinary value, we can infer that $\neg I \textit{ think P!}$ (i.e. of the two alternatives *I think P!* is the excluded one). From this, we can derive *I think $\neg P!$* following analyses of *Neg Raising* in terms of the *excluded middle* (Bartsch, 1973; Heim, 2000; Gajewski, 2005) and the notion of *Opinionated Speaker*: a speaker is opinionated about α if it holds that 'the speaker is certain that α ' \vee 'the speaker is certain that $\neg\alpha$ ' (Soames, 1982; Sauerland, 2004; Fox, 2007). The derivation is given in (33).


- (33) $\neg I \textit{ think P!}$ (*I think P!* is the denied alternative)
 $I \textit{ think P!} \vee I \textit{ think } \neg P!$ (*Opinionated Speaker*; excluded middle)
 $\hline \therefore I \textit{ think } \neg P!$

For our purposes, we assume that *Opinionated Speaker* is a pragmatic presupposition, and as such survives negation. Therefore, because $\neg I \textit{ think P!}$ and *I think P!* result in a contradiction, (32) also infers *I think that $\neg P!$* . The consequence of this is that (32) can indirectly signal the speaker's disagreement, which we argued is a key component in concession. Thus, if the information about “speaker/addressee attitudes” is encoded at some level where '*pa*' may be associated with it, we can derive the concessive reading of '*pa*'-imperatives in conjunction with two independently needed assumptions concerning *Neg Raising* and the *Opinionated Speaker*.

The question now remains as to where these “speaker/addressee attitudes” are encoded. Recall

¹⁸It may seem odd, given that focus marking is often directly tied to prosody, to talk about covert elements being in the focus. But see e.g. Heim (1992) and Ippolito (2007) for an unrelated use of focus on covert elements.

that both ‘*pa*’ and ‘*-wa*’ are sensitive to syntax in terms of the way they associate with focus. The former must precede the focus it associates with and follow backgrounded material, whereas the latter attaches to the focused constituent. A fairly standard way to approach the syntactic sensitivity of such particles is to assume that the different kinds of narrow focus correspond to different segments of syntactic structure.¹⁹ We can then think of focus sensitive particles like ‘*pa*’ and ‘*-wa*’ (represented as IF) as needing to syntactically scope over the narrow focus. The rough syntactic representation of a matrix imperative in (34) can then be divided into three parts corresponding to the three main readings we discussed: (i) readings matching those in regular declaratives (IF₁ level), (ii) modal contrast (IF₂ level), and finally (iii) concession—contrast at the level of the “performative projection”, where speaker/addressee attitudes are encoded (IF₃ level).



But is the performative projection actually present in the syntax? There is evidence from the behavior of concessive imperatives in Slovenian suggesting that it is. Slovenian allows imperatives to be embedded in indirect speech reports (Sheppard and Golden, 2002; Stegovec and Kaufmann, 2015), as in (35). Note that this example also contains ‘*pa*’, which is in second position in the embedded clause, preceding everything but the complementizer. Crucially, such imperatives can only get a non-concessive interpretation.²⁰ This means that the embedded clause cannot be interpreted as conceding to the addressee neither from the perspective of the original speaker—“Slyboots”, nor from the perspective of the actual speaker in the given context.

- (35) Zvitorepec je rekel, da **pa** kupi lososa.
 S.NOM AUX.3 said.M that *pa* buy.IMP.(2) salmon.ACC
 i. ‘Slyboots said that you should buy salmon instead.’ [✓contrastive object]
 ii. *‘Slyboots said that you should buy salmon then.’ [✗concessive]

The lack of the concessive reading in embedded imperatives can be straightforwardly derived assuming that the performative projection is present only in matrix clauses, as in embedded

¹⁹See e.g. Katzir (2007) for a specific implementation in terms of *structural focus alternatives*.

²⁰Apart from focus on ‘*salmon*’ (in the translation), other non-concessive readings are also available.

imperatives like the one in (35) the matrix attitude verb serves the same purpose (see Stegovec and Kaufmann, 2015; Stegovec, 2016). Note that ‘*pa*’ can only precede the imperative verb and its arguments as it must immediately follow the complementizer—and therefore the matrix clause. Since ‘*pa*’ can only associate with foci to its right and no performative projection is present in the embedded clause, our account correctly predicts the lack of a concessive reading.

What is the performative projection? Ross’s (1970) original performative hypothesis is riddled with problems (for discussion, see Speas and Tenny, 2003) and has largely been abandoned. However, there have been more recent revivals of similar ideas, such as Speas and Tenny’s (2003) Speech Act Participant projection, where the speaker and addressee are directly encoded into the syntax, or Pearson’s (2012) use of attitudinal operators, where the speaker or addressee are encoded as attitude holders via presuppositions. In both cases, these special syntactic means of encoding speaker or addressee attitudes are assumed to be absent in most embedded clauses, which fits our explanation for the lack of embedded concessive imperatives. In fact, Pearson’s approach is also adopted in Stegovec (2016, 2018) to account for independent asymmetries between matrix and embedded imperatives attested in Slovenian. There is thus converging evidence pointing towards the need to encode speaker and addressee attitudes in the syntax and our discussion of concessive imperatives confirms this further.

To conclude, we have shown that one can maintain a unified lexical entry for ‘*pa*’ in Slovenian and still explain both its regular function as a topic marker as well as its discourse particle function. In addition, this account also suggests that the characteristic semantic function of imperatives is the result of both a modal operator IMP (Kaufmann, 2012; Stegovec, 2016) and a syntactic encoding of the speakers attitudes—introduced by a silent performative projection in matrix clauses and the embedding attitude verb in embedded imperatives. This last split crucially allows for an analysis where the modal contrast reading is derived independently from the concessive imperative reading. It is not entirely clear alternative more “minimal” analyses of imperatives (e.g. in terms of *To-Do Lists*; Portner, 2007) would capture the same facts.

5. How are ‘*pa*’ and ‘*wa*’ different?

We have shown thus far how the different readings ‘*pa*’ and ‘*-wa*’ may yield can be derived. But recall that not all the readings ‘*pa*’ can yield are available with ‘*-wa*’. Most notably, ‘*-wa*’ does not give rise to concessive readings—unlike ‘*pa*’ in Slovenian. Although we do not offer a conclusive answer to this issue, we present two tentative solutions that will hopefully help to shed light on the language independent factors at play here. Assuming our analysis of concessive imperatives is on the right track, the concessive reading should be derivable in the same way in both languages—by invoking focus alternatives where speaker’s and addressee’s attitudes are contrasted. The two particles play a rather minimal role here, as they are only required to associate with the focus; they must scope over it. Based on this, then the lack of a concessive reading with Japanese ‘*-wa*’ should result from an independent point of variation between the two which prohibits it to scope over the performative projection.²¹

A promising split to examine is the fact that ‘*-wa*’—but crucially not ‘*pa*’—also has an “at least”

²¹A point of variation we do not consider is the ability of ‘*-wa*’ to yield hanging topics, which ‘*pa*’ cannot do:

reading associated with it (this can be seen as resulting from a scalar implicature triggered by ‘-*wa*’ or contrastive topics themselves; cf. Jackendoff 1972; Hara 2006; Tomioka 2010b). This effect is shown in relation to numerals bearing ‘-*wa*’ in (36).

- (36) Taro-*wa* doitu-ni tooka(-kan)-**wa** taizaisimasi-ta.
 Taro-TOP Germany-in ten-day-for-*wa* stay-PAST
 ‘Taro stayed in Germany for at least ten days.’ (Schwarz and Shimoyama, 2011: 403)

This reading requires some notion of a scale or ordering between alternatives so that the focused expression can be “ranked” with respect to the other alternatives. It is not clear in contrast, how the focused speaker and addressee attitudes required for the concessive reading could be placed on a scale (at least if *I think* and *You think* exhaust all the options). Therefore, if the “at least” reading is an inherent property of ‘-*wa*’, when it associates with focus (cf. (2c’) vs. (1b,4b,5)), this could be sufficient to prevent it from scoping over the performative projection and therefore blocking it from occurring with concessive imperatives.

A more straightforward solution would be to tie the split directly to the morpho-syntactic status of ‘*pa*’ and ‘-*wa*’. Assuming that syntax maps directly to semantics (cf. (34)), restricting the syntactic positions the particles can occupy should also restrict their scope in semantics. Recall that ‘*pa*’ is a 2nd position clitic and ‘-*wa*’ (in imperatives) is a suffix placed above the verb stem and below the IMP morpheme (see (39b) below). Its morpho-syntactic distribution is even further restricted, as it can only attach to select “hosts” (e.g. it cannot attach to tense markers). ‘*Pa*’ also differs in a crucial way from other clitics in Slovenian with respect to clitic placement. For instance, Slovenian allows 2nd position clitics to occur in 1st position in some matrix clauses:

- (37) a. Podal mu je svoj-o sablj-o.
 passed 3.M.DAT AUX.3 self’s-ACC sword-ACC
 ‘He passed him his sword.’
 b. Mu je podal svoj-o sablj-o.
 3.M.DAT AUX.3 passed self’s-ACC sword-ACC
 ‘He passed him his sword.’


This exceptional placement is not possible in imperatives when the verb is the first non-clitic (cf. (38a,b)) (Sheppard and Golden, 2002). The only exception to this is ‘*pa*’, as shown in (38c).

-
- (i) a. Kudamono-**wa** John-ga ringo-o tabe-ta
 fruit-WA John-NOM apple-ACC eat-PAST
 ‘As for the fruits, John ate an apple.’
 b. *Hrana/o **pa**, Lakotnik ljubi klobase.
 food.NOM/ACC PA Hungerpot loves sausages.ACC
 ‘As for food, Hungerpot loves sausages.’

There is no reason to think the hanging topic construction is comparable to the sort of constructions we took for the basis of our analysis of concessive imperatives, where focus plays the main role.

- (38) a. *Poda-j mu svoj-o sablj-o!*
 PASS-IMP.(2) 3.M.DAT self's-ACC sword-ACC
 'Pass him your sword!'
- b. **Mu poda-j svoj-o sablj-o!*
 3.M.DAT PASS-IMP.(2) self's-ACC sword-ACC
 int. 'Pass him your sword!'
- c. *Pa podaj mu svoj-o sablj-o!*
 PA PASS-IMP.(2) 3.M.DAT self's-ACC sword-ACC
 'Well, pass him your sword then!'

This may be why '*pa*' occurs with concessive imperatives—it can occur exceptionally high in matrix clauses, above all overt material (cf. (39a)). We suggest, then, that in matrix clauses this allows '*pa*' to associate with focus in the performative projection. On the other hand, '*-wa*' attaches to the verb (cf. (39b)), so it may scope over the verb and anything in its extended projection, but not anything outside it—thus excluding the performative projection.²²



This approach may explain why there are some concessive imperatives in Japanese which can be analyzed as employing '*-wa*'. These cases have a sentence-initial host to which '*-wa*' can attach (as opposed to the verb) and the concessive reading becomes available in this case, as shown in (40) (the phonological string '*de-wa*' is often contracted into '*zyaa*' in Japanese).

- (40) *de-wa(/zyaa), ik-e!*
 Cop-WA go-IMP
 'Well, go then!'

If in (40) the “high” '*-wa*', like '*pa*', occurs sufficiently high in the syntax to scope over the performative projection in the semantics, this would be expected from our analysis. But due to space limitations, we postpone a detailed analysis of such examples until future work.

²²Note that we are somewhat vague about how affixes take scope outside the word (and we are not alone in doing this). In simple terms, one can think of it analogously to how affixal negation works: if NEG is an affix on the verb, it does not only scope over the verb itself, but also the arguments the verb takes, etc. Crucially, it does not scope over elements outside the extended projection of the verb—such as what we assume the performative projection to be (and possibly MoodP). In this sense, '*pa*' behaves like sentential negation, and '*-wa*' like verbal negation.

6. Conclusion

In this paper, we hope to have shown the advantage of not treating information structure marking and discourse particles as separate entities at least with respect to concessive imperatives. We have shown, based on a careful comparison of Slovenian and Japanese, that the two domains do not have to be distinguished. The Slovenian topic particle ‘*pa*’, which also licenses concessive imperatives, does not have to be treated differently in terms of its contribution to the meaning of the sentence; both when it delineates the sentence topic from its focus and when it introduces a concessive imperative, it is merely associating with focus alternatives. The difference is only in the type of the elements that are in the sentence focus. Our discussion hopefully also contributes to the understanding of the fundamental semantic properties of imperatives. In particular, by looking at the meaning and function of concessive imperatives and exploring, more generally, which aspects of imperatives may be contrasted in the discourse. Of course, there are several questions that remain open. To what extent are similar strategies employed cross-linguistically? Can other discourse particles be modeled in the same way? These are important questions that warrant further study as we move forward with this project.

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